Oxytocin modulates third-party sanctioning of selfish and generous behavior within and between groups by Daughters, Katie et al.
Accepted Manuscript
Title: Oxytocin modulates third-party sanctioning of selfish
and generous behavior within and between groups
Author: Katie Daughters Antony S.R. Manstead Femke S.
Ten Velden Carsten K.W. De Dreu
PII: S0306-4530(16)30867-8
DOI: http://dx.doi.org/doi:10.1016/j.psyneuen.2016.11.039
Reference: PNEC 3478
To appear in:
Received date: 28-10-2016
Accepted date: 29-11-2016
Please cite this article as: {http://dx.doi.org/
This is a PDF file of an unedited manuscript that has been accepted for publication.
As a service to our customers we are providing this early version of the manuscript.
The manuscript will undergo copyediting, typesetting, and review of the resulting proof
before it is published in its final form. Please note that during the production process
errors may be discovered which could affect the content, and all legal disclaimers that
apply to the journal pertain.
Oxytocin Influences Third-Party Punishment and Reward 
1 
 
Oxytocin Modulates Third-Party Sanctioning of Selfish and Generous Behavior Within 
and Between Groups 
 
Katie Daughtersa, Antony S. R. Mansteada, Femke S. Ten Veldenb,  
Carsten K. W. De Dreuc,d, * 
 
a School of Psychology, Cardiff University, Cardiff, United Kingdom, CF10 3AT 
b Department of Psychology, University of Amsterdam, 1018 WB, Amsterdam, The 
Netherlands 
c Center for Experimental Economics and Political Decision Making (CREED), University of 
Amsterdam, 1018 WB Amsterdam, the Netherlands 
d Social and Organizational Psychology, Leiden University, 2300 RB Leiden, the Netherlands 
 
* Corresponding Author: Carsten K.W. De Dreu 
Email: c.k.w.dedreu@fsw.leidenuniv.nl 
Telephone: +31 (0)6 15056378 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Oxytocin Influences Third-Party Punishment and Reward 
2 
 
Highlights 
 
 We examined the possibility that third-party punishment and reward of others’ trust 
and reciprocation is modulated by oxytocin 
 Punishment (reward) was higher for selfish (generous) investors and trustees when 
investors and/or trustees were in-group rather than outgroup 
 Differential treatment of in-group (versus out-group) investors was especially strong 
when participants received oxytocin rather than placebo 
 We conclude that oxytocin contributes to creating and enforcing in-group norms of 
cooperation and trust.  
 
 
Abstract 
Human groups function because members trust each other and reciprocate cooperative 
contributions, and reward others’ cooperation and punish their non-cooperation. Here we 
examined the possibility that such third-party punishment and reward of others’ trust and 
reciprocation is modulated by oxytocin, a neuropeptide generally involved in social bonding 
and in-group (but not out-group) serving behavior. Healthy males and females (N=100) self-
administered a placebo or 24 IU of oxytocin in a randomized, double-blind, between-subjects 
design. Participants were asked to indicate (incentivized, costly) their level of reward or 
punishment for in-group (outgroup) investors donating generously or fairly to in-group 
(outgroup) trustees, who back-transferred generously, fairly or selfishly. Punishment (reward) 
was higher for selfish (generous) investments and back-transfers when (i) investors were in-
group rather than outgroup, and (ii) trustees were in-group rather than outgroup, especially 
when (iii) participants received oxytocin rather than placebo. It follows, first, that oxytocin 
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leads individuals to ignore out-groups as long as out-group behavior is not relevant to the in-
group and, second, that oxytocin contributes to creating and enforcing in-group norms of 
cooperation and trust.  
 
Key Words – Oxytocin, parochial altruism, competition, endocrinology, economic games  
 
1. Introduction 
Humans are social animals and much of their evolutionary success has been attributed to their 
capacity to cooperate with others in social groups (Axelrod & Hamilton, 1981). Relative to 
other species, humans are more likely to cooperate with unfamiliar and genetically unrelated 
others who go on to form cohesive groups (Hill et al., 2011) with distinct, group-serving norms, 
traditions, and cultural practices (Fehr & Fischbacher, 2004a; Mesoudi, 2016). Indeed no 
matter how distinct group norms and traditions may be, one common function underlying many 
of these aspects is to steer group members away from self-interested behavior and towards 
group-serving, cooperative behavior (Bowles & Gintis, 2011). Accordingly, norm abiding and 
in-group benefitting behavior is commonly appreciated and sometimes rewarded, whereas 
norm violations and selfishness are typically frowned upon and often punished (Balliet & Van 
Lange, 2013). 
Group-living provides fitness functionality to its individual members (Darwin, 1873), 
and it stands to reason that over evolutionary time humans have become biologically prepared 
for group-serving behavior, such as costly cooperation and norm compliance (Burnham & 
Johnson, 2005; Fehr & Fischbacher, 2004a). Resonating with this possibility is work linking 
group-serving behavior to oxytocin, an evolutionarily ancient neuropeptide that is produced in 
the hypothalamus, and is pivotal in social bond formation and maintenance (Carter, 2014; 
Donaldson & Young, 2008; Meyer-Lindenberg, Domes, Kirsch, & Heinrichs, 2011). 
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Synthesized primarily in the paraventricular and supraoptic nuclei of the hypothalamus 
(Sakamoto et al., 2007), oxytocin acts as a neuromodulator affecting a range of social acts 
including (i) the cortico-amygdala circuitry to reduce withdrawal from social threat (Domes et 
al., 2007); and (ii) the “wanting” mesocorticolimbic circuitry promoting (affiliative) approach 
to positive social targets (Harari-Dahan & Bernstein, 2014; Kemp & Guastella, 2011).  
In group-living species such as prairie voles, meerkats, and primates (including 
humans), elevated oxytocin (following administration or measured from saliva, blood, or urine) 
is associated with an increased ability to discriminate between familiar and unfamiliar others 
(Ferguson, Young, & Insel, 2002; Rimmele, Hediger, Heinrichs, & Klaver, 2009), prosocial 
approach towards those seen as familiar and in-group (as opposed to unfamiliar or outgroup) 
(De Dreu, Greer, Van Kleef, Shalvi, & Handgraaf, 2011; De Dreu & Kret, 2015; Declerck, 
Boone, & Kiyonari, 2010), and with enhanced willingness to protect and defend one’s group 
and its territory (Bosch, 2013; De Dreu, Shalvi, Greer, Van Kleef, & Handgraaf, 2012).  
Whereas evidence suggests that oxytocin shifts individuals’ focus from their self-
interests towards those of their group (De Dreu & Kret, 2016), it is unknown whether (and 
indeed how) oxytocin also modulates the willingness to police and enforce such group-serving 
behaviors in others, and in particular in one’s in-group. In general, such norm-enforcing 
tendencies are well-documented and functional for group-living, especially within group 
cooperation. By policing behaviors that are disadvantageous to, or defy the social norms of, 
the group, group members are kept from straying into selfish or exploitive behavior that 
endangers the functionality of the group and reduces group efficiency (Gintis, 2000; Gintis, 
Bowles, Boyd, & Fehr, 2003).  
Experimental work on third-party punishment shows that humans engage in such 
policing and norm-enforcing behavior (Fehr & Fischbacher, 2004b; Nikiforakis & Mitchell, 
2014). In these experiments, participants typically witness an exchange between two other 
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individuals, one of whom is exploiting (or benefitting) the other. Participants are given an 
endowment that is valuable to them, and allowed to use part or all of this endowment to punish 
the perpetrator (and sometimes to reward the victim). The participant is not personally 
involved, and there are no consequences of the observed social exchange, except that extending 
a punishment (or reward) is personally costly. Accordingly, it is not in the individual’s 
immediate self-interest to punish others for selfishness, or to reward others for their generosity. 
Nevertheless, there is converging evidence from different lines of research that humans do 
punish, at personal cost, selfishness in others, and to a lesser extent, reward others for their 
cooperation and generosity (Fehr & Gächter, 2002; Hu et al., 2016; Nikiforakis & Mitchell, 
2014).  
Tendencies to police others and third-party punishment can increase within group levels 
of cooperation and reduce group members’ tendencies to defect (Dreber, Rand, Fudenberg, & 
Nowak, 2008; Egas & Riedl, 2008). Moreover, third-party punishment appears in-group 
biased: Costly punishments are given more readily when the ‘victim’ of the selfish behavior is 
an in-group rather than outgroup member (Baumgartner, Schiller, Rieskamp, Gianotti, & 
Knoch, 2013; Shinada, Yamagishi, & Ohmura, 2004). Possibly, this reflects that in-groups 
rather than out-groups have stronger fitness functionality to the individual and costly 
investments, including those in third-party punishment and reward, have stronger functionality 
to the individual when targeted at in-group members especially. Here we expected to also find 
such an in-group bias in third-party decision making. Following the above review on oxytocin, 
such in-group bias in third-party punishment and reward should be stronger when individuals 
receive oxytocin (versus placebo).  
We examined these possibilities in a novel Third-Party Punishment and Reward Trust 
Game (TTPR-TG). In this game, participants see the exchange between in investor and a trustee 
and are can punish or reward the investor and the trustee. Whereas the exchange between 
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investor and trustee has no consequences to the participant, extending a punishment or reward 
is costly to the participant and costly (in case of punishment) or rewarding (in case of reward) 
to the investor or trustee at a 1:3 ratio. The exchange between investor and trustee has the 
typical properties of a classic Trust Game (Berg et al., 1995): investors have an endowment E 
from which they can transfer X (with 0 ≤ X ≤ E) in their Trustee. Investment X is tripled and 
Trustees decide on a back-transfer Y (with 0 ≤ Y ≤3X). In this study, investors and/or trustees 
were from the participant’s in-group or out-group, and manipulated to be generous, fair, or 
selfish. This allowed us to see whether and how oxytocin influenced punishing and rewarding 
selfish or generous investors and trustees from one’s in-group or out-group.  
2. Methods and Materials 
2.1 Ethics and Participants 
The study was approved by the University of Amsterdam Ethics Committee (file 2015-WOP-
4100), and adhered to the Declaration of Helsinki. Participants gave written informed consent 
prior to the study, and received full debriefing upon completion of the experiment. The study 
did not involve deception and was fully incentivized.  
To estimate the required sample size for this study, we relied on effect sizes reported in 
earlier studies on oxytocin and in-group bounded cooperation (De Dreu et al., 2010, 
Experiment 1 and 2, [partial] eta-squared = 0.154 and 0.122, respectively; Ten Velden et al., 
2016: [partial] η2 = 0.048). Using these observed eta-squared as inputs in G-Power 3.1 (Faul, 
Erdfelder, Lang, & Buchner, 2007), with α = 0.05 and β = 0.80, yielded a required sample for 
between-within interactions in ANOVA of 62, 88, and 108, respectively. Since the last power 
estimate was based on a study involving male and female subjects, and the current study also 
targeted a mixed gender sample, we decided to recruit at least 100 participants. This fits the 
power estimate and sample size of 121 of another recent study in which both male and female 
subjects participated and following intranasal administration of oxytocin or placebo engaged 
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in an evaluation/assessment rather than decision-making task (De Dreu, Kret, & Sauter, 2016). 
In the present study we used stratified sampling to assign healthy males (N=36) and females 
(N=64) to conditions, in which they self-administered 24 IU of intranasal OT or an equivalent 
amount of a matching placebo.  
Participants were recruited via an online system, which described the study as 
investigating the effects of medication on decision making. Participants were offered a 
monetary reward of €10 for their time, in addition to any earnings accrued during the study. 
Participants’ earnings were determined by decisions made by fellow participants, a fact that 
was made salient in the instructions. To preserve confidentiality, actual payments were wired 
by bank transfer to the subject’s private account. Per local policy, these transfers could not be 
made until data collection was complete, as a result, payments were made 3 to 6 weeks after 
participation.  
Exclusion criteria were having a significant physical or psychiatric illness, assessed by 
medical screening prior to participation. A total of 100 participants took part in the study; one 
participant was dropped from the analysis due to missing data, leaving 49 participants in the 
OT condition, and 50 participants in the placebo condition, with a mean age of 21.83 years 
(SD=3.12). Age did not differ between treatment conditions, t(97)=.863, p > .250. Due to 
stratified sampling, the ratio of females to males across treatment was almost identical 
(OT=32:17 vs. PL=32:18). Female participants’ menstrual cycle and oral contraceptive status 
as self-reported during medical screening (Follicular phase: n = 24; Luteal phase: n = 35; 
female participants on oral contraceptives: n = 37) did not influence results or conclusions. 
2.2 Treatment and Experimental Procedures 
The study involved a randomized, double-blind, placebo-controlled, between-subjects design. 
Participants were asked to refrain from consuming drugs or alcohol the night before the study, 
and from smoking or drinking caffeine in the 2 hours prior to the study. Using a double-blind 
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procedure, participants were assigned to either the OT or the placebo condition. They self-
administered a placebo or 24 IU (3 puffs of 4 IU per nostril) of Syntocinon (synthetic OT spray, 
Novartis). The placebo spray matched the OT spray with respect to all ingredients apart from 
the synthetic OT (De Dreu et al., 2010).  
On arrival, participants were seated in individual cubicles so that they could not see or 
speak to one another. After providing informed consent, they self-administered either a placebo 
or OT spray under the supervision of the experimenter, who then unlocked the computer; the 
remainder of the experiment was self-guided (see Figure 1 for a graphical representation of the 
study’s procedure and time-line). In the first 25 minutes, participants completed a series of 
questionnaires (for further detail see Online Supplementing Information) that had no other 
function than to fill the a ‘wait period’ that is typical in OT administration studies both in our 
own laboratory (Kret & De Dreu, 2013; Shalvi & De Dreu, 2014; Ten Velden, Baas, Shalvi, 
Kret, & De Dreu, 2014; Ten Velden, Daughters, & De Dreu, 2016), and that of others 
(Baumgartner, Heinrichs, Vonlanthen, Fischbacher, & Fehr, 2008; Kirsch et al., 2005; Kosfeld, 
Heinrichs, Zak, Fischbacher, & Fehr, 2005). Several studies have demonstrated physiological 
effects of intranasal administration of OT after this load time (Daughters et al., 2015; Gossen 
et al., 2012; Van IJzendoorn, Bhandari, Van der Veen, Grewen, & Bakermans-Kranenburg, 
2012; Weisman, Zagoory-Sharon, & Feldman, 2012). The computer automatically started the 
instructions for the experimental tasks and filled out a short questionnaire. This completed the 
experiment.  
Figure 1 About Here 
2.3 Materials and Tasks 
Participants were randomly allocated to one of two 3-person groups and given 
instructions for a fully incentivized standard trust game (see Figure 1). It was explained that 
one fellow-participant (henceforth investor) would be asked to transfer X from their 
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“Investment Endowment” (IE; with E=€10, and 0 ≤ X ≤ 10) to another fellow-participant 
(henceforth trustee). Transfers would be tripled, and trustees would then be asked to decide a 
back-transfer amount, Y (with 0 ≤ Y ≤ 3X). Next, participants were shown a series of possible 
exchanges between investors and trustees, and for each exchange they would have the 
opportunity to assign “evaluation points,” first to the investor and then to the trustee (range -
10 to +10). Both punishing (negative values, range -10 to -1) and rewarding (positive values, 
+1 to +10) were costly to the participant: Each point resulted in the subtraction of €0.25 from 
the participant’s “Evaluation Endowment” (EE; with EE=€5) and either subtraction 
(punishment) or addition (reward) of €0.75 to the target’s earnings. Thus, assigning punishing 
or rewarding points had financial implications for both the participant and the target. 
Participants made reward/punishment decisions for both the investor and trustee when 
the investor was generous, fair, or selfish; and the recipient was generous, fair, or selfish 
(although some combinations were not presented because they were logically impossible, e.g., 
investing 0 and back-transferring 20). Because the trustee cannot ‘play’ in trials where the 
investor transfers 0, such trials are not included in analyses; as a result, investor transfers are 
either fair or generous, but trustee back-transfers can be selfish, fair or generous. Thus, we had 
11 exchange types: when the investor transferred 0 and the trustee back-transferred 0; when 
the investor transferred 5 and the trustee back-transferred 0, 5, 10 or 15; and when the investor 
transferred 10 and the trustee back-transferred 0, 5, 10, 15, 20, or 30 (see Figure 1). 
Investors could be in-group (identified by assignment to a team called “Team A”, the 
participant’s group) or outgroup (identified by assignment to a team called “Team B”, not the 
participant’s group) members, and trustees could also be in-group or outgroup members. Each 
type of exchange was presented four times (with the investor being in-group or outgroup, and 
the trustee being in-group or outgroup). Because there were four dyads, two additional 
members of the group (i.e., A1 and A2), and 11 possible exchange types, for which the 
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participant had to make two sanctioning decisions (one for the investor and one for the trustee), 
participants completed 132 sanctioning decisions. For intragroup dyads participants completed 
1 trial (and therefore 2 decisions) per exchange type. For intergroup dyads participants 
completed 2 trials (and therefore 4 decisions) per exchange type and we computed the average 
across these exchange types.  
To incentivize the task and avoid deception, participants completed the experimental 
task by making six decisions in a standard Trust Game – two as the investor (once playing with 
an in-group trustee, once playing with an outgroup trustee), and four as the trustee (with a 
generous [or fair] in-group [or outgroup] investor). As described in the participant’s 
instructions, behavior in the Trust Game would be coupled to a randomly chosen third-party 
decision trial that matched the exchange in question, so each participant’s pay-off was 
dependent on their own decisions and those by other participants. We explored treatment and 
gender effects on these trust decisions, and found males to invest more than females (M = 2.57 
versus M = 2.28, F(1, 95) = 8.35, p = 0.005) and higher investments in in-group relative to out-
group trustees (M = 2.57 versus M = 2.32, F(1, 95) = 17.78, p = 0.0001). No effects for 
treatment were observed, which corresponds to work showing no overall treatment effects on 
investment decisions in trust games (Nave, Camerer & McCullough, 2015). For back-transfers, 
we also found higher back-transfers to in-group rather than out-group members, F(1, 95) = 
8.07, p = 0.006, and towards generous rather than fair investors, F(1, 95) = 240.12, p = 0.001.  
3. Results 
3.1 Data Preparation and Analytic Strategy 
Data from one participant were missing due to technical failure and could therefore not be 
included in the analyses. Exploratory analyses in which we controlled for personality measures 
(see Supplementary Materials) did not change the results or conclusions.  
Hypotheses were tested using a 2 (treatment: oxytocin/placebo) x 2 (gender: 
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male/female) x 2 (investor group: in-group/outgroup) x 2 (trustee group: in-group/outgroup) x 
2 (investor’s transfer: generous/fair) x 3 (trustee’s back-transfer: generous/fair/selfish) mixed-
model Analysis of Variance, with the first two factors being between-subjects, and the 
remaining factors being within-subjects. Interaction effects were decomposed using simple 
effects analysis that preserve the overall error term and degrees of freedom (Winer, Brown, & 
Michels, 1971) (the corresponding test-statistics based on the local error terms and 
corresponding degrees of freedom replicated results and are reported in brackets where 
relevant). Accordingly, p-values do not have to be corrected for multiple testing as we fitted 
the data only once, and the most robust estimate of specific contrasts is obtained (Rosenthal & 
Rosnow, 1985; Tatsuoka & Lohnes, 1988; Winer et al., 1971). Because in several interactions 
involving within-subjects factors the Mauchly’s Test of Sphericity was significant (ps < 
0.0001) the hypothesis that within-factor error terms are correlated could not be rejected. We 
thus relied on the more robust yet also more conservative multivariate rather than mixed-model 
F-tests (Tatsuoka & Lohnes, 1988). 
Because gender did not interact with treatment in any of the analyses meaning that 
findings reported below hold across male and female participants. The gender effects we did 
observe are summarized in the Supplementary Materials. Also, as a robustness check we 
explored whether findings reported below change when we controlled for personality measures 
(see Supplementary Materials), but never found this to be the case.  
3.2 Third-Party Sanctioning of Investors  
Generous transfers were rewarded more (M = 5.587, SE = 0.317) than fair transfers (M = 2.752, 
SE = 0.251), F(1, 97) = 100.399, p < 0.001,  = 0.514. Investors received higher rewards 
when their trustee’s back-transfers were selfish (M = 4.827, SE = 0.240) rather than fair (M = 
4.131, SE = 0.266) or generous (M = 3.550, SE = 0.287), F(1.47, 139.42) = 31.724, p < 0.001, 
 = 0.250, and in-group investors were rewarded more (M = 4.523, SE = 0.256) than outgroup 
2
p
2
p
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investors (M = 3.816, SE = 0.264), F(1, 97) = 15.58, p ≤ 0.001, η2  = 0.138. 
Figure 2 About Here 
The main effect for investor group membership was qualified by an interaction with 
treatment, F(1, 95) = 6.101, p = 0.015, η2 = 0.059 (see Figure 2). Simple effects analysis 
revealed that whereas participants in the placebo condition did not discriminate between in-
group and outgroup investors, F(1, 95) = 1.10, p = 0.297, those who received oxytocin 
rewarded in-group investors more than outgroup investors, F(1, 95) =  20.385, p ≤ 0.001. The 
treatment x investor’s group membership interaction was further qualified by an interaction 
between treatment, investor’s group membership, trustee’s group membership, and trustee’s 
back-transfer, F(2, 94) = 4.593, p = 0.012, η2 = 0.087. In keeping with the nature of the 
treatment x investor’s group membership effect, we decomposed this complex effect using 
simple effects analysis for the (interactions among) treatment, investor’s group membership, 
and trustee’s group membership within each level of the trustee’s back-transfer. Because 
effects were tested three times (for each level of back-transfer), we corrected for multiple 
comparisons by setting α = 0.05/3 = 0.015 as the critical p-value. 
When the trustee’s back-transfers were selfish, in-group investors received more when 
their selfish trustee was outgroup rather than in-group (investor’s x trustee’s group 
membership, F[1, 95] =  6.73, p = 0.001). Furthermore, in-group investors were rewarded more 
than outgroup investors, F(1, 95) = 14.71, p = 0.001, η2 = 0.226, yet only when subjects 
received oxytocin, F(1, 95) = 15.85, p = 0.001 (F[1,48] = 13.99, p = 0.001), and not when they 
received placebo, F(1, 95) = 0.24, p = 0.625 (F[1,47] = 0.28, p = 0.601) (Fig 3A; overall 
investor’s group membership x treatment, F[1, 95] = 8.18, p = 0.005).  
Figure 3ABC About Here 
When the trustee’s back-transfers were fair, the interaction among investor and trustee’s 
group membership was not significant, F < 1. However, as with selfish back-transfers, in-group 
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investors were rewarded more than outgroup investors, F(1, 95) = 11.78, p = 0.001, again only 
when subjects received oxytocin, F(1, 95) = 9.32, p = 0.003 (F[1,48] = 7.53, p  = 0.009), and 
not when they received placebo, F(1, 95) = 0.79, p = 0.376 (F[1,47] = 1.03, p = 0.315) (Fig 
3B; overall investor’s group membership x treatment, F[1, 95] = 3.84, p = 0.053; marginal).  
When the trustee’s back-transfers were generous, the interaction among investor and 
trustee’s group membership was again not significant, F < 1. Yet here too, in-group investors 
were rewarded more than outgroup investors, F(1, 95) = 17.05, p = 0.001, when subjects 
received oxytocin, F(1, 95) = 18.18, p = 0.001 (F[1,48] = 15.53, p = 0.001), and not when they 
received placebo, F(1, 95) = 1.84, p = 0.178 (F[1,47] = 2.21, p = 0.143) (Fig 3C; overall 
investor’s group membership x treatment, F[1, 95] = 5.40, p = 0.022).  
Taken together, subjects who received oxytocin rather than placebo rewarded in-group 
investors more than outgroup investors. This treatment x investor’s group membership 
interaction was nominally significant at all three levels of the trustee’s back-transfer, yet 
strongest (and surpassed the Bonferonni-corrected threshold) when back-transfers were selfish. 
Thus, when trustee’s back-transfers were selfish, subjects given oxytocin compensated their 
investors but less so when investors were from the outgroup.  
3.3 Third-Party Sanctioning of Trustees  
We found that outgroup trustees were rewarded less (M = 0.989, SE = 0.207) than in-group 
trustees (M = 1.623, SE = 0.215), F(1, 95) = 11.51, p = 0.001, η2 = 0.108, generous transfers 
were rewarded more (M = 2.161, SE = 0.213) than fair transfers (M = 0.452, SE = 0.195), F(1, 
95) = 124.90, p < 0.001, η2 =0.568, and generous back-transfers were rewarded more (M = 
5.914, SE = 0.304) than fair back-transfers (M = 2.219, SE = 0.298), which were rewarded 
more than selfish back-transfers (M = -4.213, SE = 3.29), F(2, 94) = 199.687, p < 0.001, η2 
=0.753. These main effects were qualified in two two-way interactions among investor’s group 
membership and trustee’s back-transfer, F(2, 94) = 8.397, p = 0.001, η2 =0.113, and trustee’s 
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group membership and trustee’s back-transfer, F(2, 94) = 4.34, p = 0.016, η2 =0.062. These 
were further qualified in two three-way interactions among investor’s group membership, 
trustee’s back-transfer, and treatment, F(2, 94) = 3.074, p = 0.051, η2 = 0.049, and trustee’s 
group membership, trustee’s back-transfer, and treatment, F(2, 94) = 2.586, p = 0.081, η2 = 
0.036 (marginal) and in a four-way interaction among investor’s group membership, trustee’s 
group membership, trustee’s back-transfer, and treatment, F(2, 94) = 3.850, p = 0.025, η2 = 
0.062.  
As with results for sanctioning of investors, we probed the nature of these effects with 
simple effects for (interactions among) investor’s group membership, trustee’s group 
membership, and treatment within each level of the trustee’s back-transfer. Because simple 
main and interaction effects were estimated three times (for each level of back-transfer), we 
corrected for multiple comparisons by setting α = 0.05/3 = 0.015 as the critical p-value. 
When back-transfers were selfish, selfish trustees were punished more when they were 
from the outgroup rather than from the in-group, F(1, 95) = 13.10, p = 0.001, η2 = 0.115. 
Furthermore, trustees were punished more when their investor was from the in-group, rather 
than the outgroup, F(1, 95) = 8.63, p = 0.004, η2 =0.084. Although the treatment x investor’s 
group membership was not significant, F(1, 95) = 1.58, p = 0.212, it can be seen in Fig 4A that 
effects of investor’s group membership were strong and significant when subjects received 
oxytocin, F(1, 95) = 9.28, p =0.003 (F[1, 48] = 6.87, p = 0.012), rather than placebo, F(1, 95) 
= 1.35, p = 0.247 (F[1, 47] = 2.06, p = 0.157).  
Figure 4ABC About Here 
When back-transfers were fair, in-group trustees were rewarded more than outgroup 
trustees, F(1, 95) = 10.47, p = 0.002, η2 = 0.086; there was some evidence that this effect was 
particularly strong when investors were in-group and subjects received placebo, and when 
investors were outgroup and subjects received oxytocin, F(1, 95) = 4.43, p = 0.038, η2 = 0.027 
Oxytocin Influences Third-Party Punishment and Reward 
15 
 
(Fig 4B). However, the effect falls above the Bonferroni-corrected threshold and none of the 
underlying contrasts were (Bonferroni-corrected) significant. We refrain from further 
interpreting this finding. 
When back-transfers were generous, trustees were rewarded more when they faced in-
group rather than outgroup investors, F(1, 95) = 12.22, p = 0.001, but only when subjects 
received oxytocin, F(1, 95) = 17.24, p = 0.001 (F[1,48] = 9.90, p = 0.003), and not when 
subjects received placebo, F(1, 95) = 0.17, p = 0.680 (F[1,47] = 0.63, p = 0.434) (Fig 4C; 
overall investor group membership x treatment, F[1, 95] = 6.86, p = 0.010, η2 = 0.068).  
Taken together, trustees were sanctioned less when they were from the in-group, and 
when interacting with an in-group rather than outgroup investors. Oxytocin modulated this 
when back-transfers were generous and, to a lesser extent, when they were selfish. When 
trustee’s back-transfers were generous, subjects given oxytocin rewarded these trustees but less 
so when the generously treated investors were from the outgroup.  
4. Conclusions and Discussion 
Individuals in groups punish those who are selfish towards other group members, and reward 
those who are generous. Such sanctioning may be costly to the individual, yet also functions to 
sustain cooperative behavior and reciprocity within the group. Indeed, there is some evidence 
that both punishment of norm violators and rewarding strong contributors is oriented more 
towards individuals belonging to one’s in-group, than towards an outgroup (Baumgartner et 
al., 2013; Schiller, Baumgartner, & Knoch, 2014; Shinada et al., 2004).  
Here we show that such intergroup discrimination in punishment and reward emerges 
especially when individuals were given oxytocin. Results suggest that individuals given 
oxytocin (versus placebo) are more likely to (i) condition their punishment and reward 
decisions on whether the target was in-group or outgroup and (ii) refrain from spending their 
money on sanctioning outgroup members—oxytocin appears to make people relatively 
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indifferent about the behavior and fate of outgroup members. Thus, compared to those given 
placebo, individuals given oxytocin rewarded someone who demonstrated generosity towards 
another group member, or reciprocated a generous offer, more when the individual was an in-
group rather than outgroup member. Likewise, they punished someone who was selfish, or 
returned a selfish offer, more when the target individual betrayed an in-group rather than an 
outgroup member.  
Findings provide further evidence that oxytocin does not make people ubiquitously 
more pro-social. This would have manifested in overall reduced punishment and increased 
reward under oxytocin, which we did not observe. In addition, current findings clarify that 
oxytocin does not induce unconditional pro-social treatment of in-group members. This would 
have manifested in reduced punishment and increased rewarding of in-group members only, 
something we did not observe. Instead, current findings support the idea that the function of 
third-party sanctioning is to regulate people’s adherence to group norms (Chavez & Bicchieri, 
2013; Fehr & Fischbacher, 2004b), that oxytocin enhances intergroup discrimination (Ten 
Velden et al., 2014), and that oxytocin shifts the individual’s focus towards the in-group (De 
Dreu, 2012; De Dreu & Kret, 2015; Ten Velden et al., 2016). Findings also demonstrate that 
this ‘oxytocin shift’ is activated in a minimal group paradigm, providing support for the 
evolutionary function of oxytocin in group behavior via a biological mechanism. It follows that 
the same pattern of results should also be observed in a real groups paradigm, a potential study 
for future research.  
Our conclusions about the possible role of oxytocin on third-party punishment and 
reward derive from an exogenous administration study, in which subjects received intranasal 
oxytocin or a matching placebo. The advantage of this method is that it permits conclusions 
about cause and effect relationships, which would not be possible if one were correlating 
endogenous oxytocin with third-party decision-making. The disadvantage of this method, 
Oxytocin Influences Third-Party Punishment and Reward 
17 
 
however, is that the neurophysiological pathways through which intranasal oxytocin affects 
brain activity and behavioral responses are not fully understood. Although there is good 
evidence that intranasal oxytocin increases the concentration of endogenous oxytocin found in 
blood plasma and saliva (Daughters et al., 2015; Gossen et al., 2012; Weisman et al., 2012), 
the evidence that intranasal oxytocin crosses the blood-brain barrier is limited (Neumann, 
Maloumby, Beiderbeck, Lukas, & Landgraf, 2013; Paloyelis et al., 2014; Striepens et al., 
2013).  
In addition to a direct effect on the brain, intranasal oxytocin may also affect brain and 
behavioral responses through its peripheral effects on the body (e.g., by affecting heart rate, or 
cortisol responses). Detailing these pathways is an important question for future research. Such 
new research may also consider the notion that individual differences exist in the peripheral 
responses to intranasal administration of oxytocin (Daughters et al., 2015). For example, one 
could investigate whether such individual differences, in turn explain individual differences in 
the extent to which people pursue in-group bounded cooperation and uphold and enforce in-
group serving norms. Future research could also consider adding a greater number of trials for 
each exchange type and dyad to further improve the reliability of the findings. 
Punishing group members for violating norms, acting selfishly, and failing to cooperate 
with others, serves the same function as rewarding members for upholding norms, being 
generous, and cooperating with others: It promotes group functioning and effectiveness, and 
therefore provides indirect benefits for the individual. It follows therefore that humans should 
be more inclined to punish and reward in-group members, than outgroup members. The current 
study finds that such functional differentiation between in-group and outgroup members was 
stronger when individuals received oxytocin. We suggest that oxytocin provides a 
neurobiological mechanism underlying in-group serving behaviors.   
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Figure Legends 
Figure 1  Timeline of the Experimental Procedure and the Third-Party Punishment and 
Reward Trust Game (TPPR-TG). 
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Figure 2  Mean allocations to investors as a function of investor group and treatment 
(range -10 to +10; displayed Mean ± SE). Connectors indicate p<0.01.  
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Figure 3 Oxytocin modulates sanctioning of in-group and outgroup investors. (A) 
Sanctioning of investors when trustees’ back-transfers were selfish (range -10 
to +10; displayed Mean ± SE). (B) Sanctioning of investors when trustees’ back-
transfers were fair (range -10 to +10; displayed Mean ± SE). (C) Sanctioning of 
investors when trustees’ back-transfers were generous (range -10 to +10; 
displayed Mean ± SE). Connectors indicate p<0.05 (Bonferroni corrected). 
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Figure 4 Oxytocin modulates sanctioning of in-group and outgroup trustees. (A) 
Sanctioning of trustees when trustees’ back-transfers were selfish (range -10 to 
+10; displayed Mean ± SE). (B) Sanctioning of trustees when trustees’ back-
transfers were fair (range -10 to +10; displayed Mean ± SE). (C) Sanctioning of 
trustees when trustees’ back-transfers were generous (range -10 to +10; 
displayed Mean ± SE). Connectors indicate p<0.05 (Bonferroni corrected). 
 
